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Doing Water Quality
Credit Trading Right
Alexandra Dapolito Dunn and Elise Bacon

u.s.

he
Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA's) Water Quality Trading Policy (Policy),
68 Fed. Reg. 1608 (2003), encourages states to
adopt voluntary water quality credit trading
programs and highlights how trading programs can facilitate the implementation of Total Maximum Daily Loads
(TMDLs), reduce Clean Water Act compliance costs,
promote voluntary pollutant reductions, and further
other important watershed-based initiatives. In the two
years that have passed since EPA released its Policy,
many public clean water agencies have explored and
then embarked on trading programs in an effort to
resolve complex water quality challenges consistent with
the Policy. Taking place in many different parts of the
country, these projects have sought not only to build on
lessons learned from the vast number of early trading
projects, but also to explore new territory as encouraged
by the Policy. Without question, today there truly is
renewed energy and interest around water quality credit
trading on the part of utility managers, watershed stakeholders, and the general public.
One might think that with this regulatory and policy
climate, the time is ideal to consider developing a water
quality credit trading program, and that the pathway to
implementation might be quite smooth. In reality,
however, many of the same core challenges that confronted almost every early trading program still remain.
These problems largely come from several inherent
inequities that are present in any watershed-based trading environment, and which cannot be completely
eliminated because they derive from existing federal
regulatory provisions. These inequities include differing regulatory authority over the parties in a trading
program, the parties' varying need to make a trade in
order to meet enforceable permit limits, and the related
willingness of and pressures on different parties to come
to the table and participate in a water quality credit
trading program.
For example, as regulated point sources, municipalities must assure compliance with the effluent limitations
in their National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
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System (NPDES) permits. As public entities responsible
for providing an essential public health service, municipalities as a practical matter almost necessarily must
come to the trading table for both regulatory and publiC
outreach reasons. For NPDES permittees not interested
in trading, regulatory authorities always retain the ability to simply exercise their enforcement powers to
address a pollutant of concern. In contrast, trading is
more discretionary for other participants in a trading
program, such as unpermitted nonpoint sources.
Recent experience reveals that when these inequities
are openly acknowledged at the start of a trading program and are not used by one party to disadvantage
another, the water quality credit trading program has the
potential to be quite successful. However, if any party
to a trading program seeks to capitalize on the inherent
inequities-either by asking too much from another
party or by trying to force a particular result-the trading program is likely to crumble under its own weight.
To make trading work in the real world, the four key
principles addressed in this article should be considered
in the up-front design and subsequent implementation
of a program. First, it should be understood that the
participants in a trading program may freely use the
credits or offsets generated under the trading program as
a part of their regular compliance efforts. The opposite
view suggests that the use of legitimately created credits
by a program participant is evidence of ultimate noncompliance. Under this approach, the trader is viewed
and ultimately treated as a violator rather than as an
innovator, and the credit is characterized as mitigation
for the violation. Programs adopting this "violator
view" encounter difficulties by suggesting that sources
should reduce effluent concentrations so greatly that the
ultimate use of a credit is unnecessary, rendering trading
moot. Moreover, treating credit trading as mitigation
creates significant regulatory and public relations disincentives for participation in what is intended to be a
voluntary effort.
Second, cost savings are a benefit. A source should
not be viewed skeptically merely because it achieves
cost savings through trading. In fact, EPA's Policy
rejects the notion that sources ultimately saving money
through trading cannot truly be benefiting the environment. Trading programs built upon the "skeptical view"
ultimately will founder if stakeholders are so overly con-
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cerned about the savings sought by permitted sources
holder satisfaction and sufficient support to take a tradthrough trading that the economic incentives for particing program from design to successful implementation.
ipation are kept below what they should be to draw
Many of the benchmark programs in this regard were
participation.
among the first formal functioning trading programs.
Third, a trading program needs to be truly voluntary.
They developed in the mid- to late-1990s, benefited
Under semivoluntary or nonvoluntary approaches, regufrom at least a five-year gestation period, and were
lators implicitly ask-or explicitly attempt-to force
launched by the early 2000s. Several newer programs
also are characterized by equity and fairness between
point sources to take on patently inequitable additional
stakeholders.
pollutant-reduction obligations in "exchange" for the
p;ivilege of trading. Many programs struggle to achieve
The benchmark group includes established programs
for these watershed areas: Lower Boise River, Idaho
the proper balance between a voluntary trading program
that leads to pollutant reductions, and a less than vol(point-point or point-nonpoint phosphorus credit
untary program that is based on the regulator's ultimate
trading); Cherry Creek, Colorado (predominantly
ability to force a reduction by reducing a point source's
point-nonpoint phosphorus credit trading); Long Island
permit limitation for a particular pollutant. This balSound, Connecticut (point-point nitrogen credit trading); San Joaquin Valley Grasslands,
ance is difficult to achieve due to
the significant differences in the
California (selenium credit trading
among irrigation districts); and Tar
Clean Water Act's approach to conPamlico River, North Carolina
trolling point and nonpoint sources
of pollution. Point sources in a
(point-point or point-nonpoint
any party to a trading
trading program always are responsinitrogen credit trading). Among
ble at the end of the day for permit
the more recent programs, three
program seeks to capitalize
compliance, and the specter of
stand out. One is the watershed
enforcement looms in the backpermit and nitrogen trading program
on the inherent inequities.
ground. On the other hand, because
for certain Neuse River, North
nonpoint sources do not require a
Carolina dischargers. Another is
permit, they can implement their
the watershed permit that supports
the trading program is
reductions in a more flexible and
point-point dissolved oxygen credit
iterative manner.
trading and point-nonpoint temperlikely to crumble under
Fourth, and finally, the level of
ature credit trading by a single utilipollutant reduction needed to generty, Clean Water Services, with four
its own weight.
ate credits must be set fairly and
wastewater treatment plants on the
with certainty. Ambiguous baselines
Tualatin River in Oregon. The
for defining creditable reductions
third is the Virginia Nutrient Credit
can undermine a trading program in
Exchange Program that will cover
two ways. Moving credit "targets"
all municipal and industrial point
can lead to a perception that there will be no measurasources in five major river basins that are tributaries to
ble pollutant reductions with trading, delaying TMDL
the Chesapeake Bay under a general permit and enable
compliance or making the ultimate attainment of water
point-point trading among them, as well as point-nonquality goals mathematically impossible. Shifting basepoint trading in specified limited circumstances.
lines also can leave credits vulnerable to diminution or
Certainly, other programs could be included in either
invalidation, thereby presenting an unacceptable level
group, but collectively these demonstrate how to do
of risk to prospective credit buyers and sellers.
water quality trading right.
The next section of this article explores how these
So how exactly-by circumstance or choice-do
four principles have been successfully followed in tradthese programs illustrate the four principles introing programs to date. This article then analyzes a curduced at the outset of this article? First and foremost,
rent trading initiative that lies in limbo because these
they clearly treat compliance achieved through tradprinciples are being ignored. Finally, we summarize key
ing as "equal" to compliance achieved without tradobservations and speculate generally on the future viaing. Within these regulatory, policy, and philosophibility of water quality trading.
cal frameworks, trading is legally, practically, and
morally equivalent to not trading-not worse and not
better, so long as effluent limits or loading caps are
Trading Done Right
met, subject of course to specific rules governing eligiA quick review of the trading programs that are being
bility, trading transactions and tracking and reporting
actively implemented across the United States today
of such transactions.
reveals that most are good, if not excellent, examples of
Supporters and participants in the benchmark prohow principles of equity and fairness can yield stakegrams were able to arrive at an approach that treats
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Second, within this framework of equivalency
trading as equal to not trading in part by agreeing on
between trading or not trading, a primary driver for
the spatial and temporal relationship between pollutant
establishing a trading option in the first place almost
loadings and reductions at one source location relative
to another. Trading ratios are the most common way
always is to lower the cost of achieving an individual or
watershed stakeholders have accounted for differences,
collective water quality-related target, such as water
quality-based effluent limits, wasteload and load allocaknown and unknown, between the impact of a pollutant
tions of TMDLs or other types of pollutant load caps or
contributed by Source A at Point A and Time A, and
reduction goals. Stakeholders know or believe that
the benefit of a pollutant reduction by Source N at
Point N and Time N. A wide variety in analytical
more cost-effective ways to control pollutant loads exist
approach and rigor is represented among the trading
than would be required or captured by a traditional regulatory approach. In a classic market sense, trading
ratio methodologies of the benchmark programs.
options harness differences in relative control costs
Several programs made extensive use of water quality
among sources. Well-designed programs create econommodels and demonstration project monitoring. Others
ic incentives for sources that can do more than required,
elected to use or had to make do with best professional
when they can sell those credits to sources with higher
judgment using what local data was available. Still othrelative control costs. Credit buyers
ers simply adopted ratios that had
been accepted elsewhere and were
have incentive to participate in
trading when they can save money
acceptable to the relevant authoriover what they would have spent to
ties and decision-makers.
Seasonally variable ratios and seaU7ell-designed programs create achieve compliance without trading.
In a practical sense, many of the
sonally bounded trading periods are
two other ways used successfully to
benchmark program credit markets
economzc Incentzves or sources are "managed," in that prices (and
establish "equivalency" between a
by implication profits) are set or
pound of pollutant traded and a
that can do more than
pound not traded.
controlled. Most are closed markets, in that only certain types of or
A critical confirmation of the
fundamental view that the trading
required, when they can sell named point sources are allowed to
buy or sell credits, and eligible nonoption, once granted and if properly
exercised, is an equal and not lesser
point source credits are preapproved
those credits to sources with
by category, location or transaction
outcome than pollutant reductions
mechanism. Despite the lack of a
achieved by other means, is the
higher relative control costs.
"pure" free market among the
complete lack of mitigation requirements or penalties levied on
benchmark programs, they all are
NPDES dischargers electing to use
unapologetically encouraging, seekcredits as permitted. In fact, most
ing-and finding-equal or better
of the permits have carefully conenvironmental results for less money
structed limits, where the permittee
through trading.
is determined to meet its limits if: (1) its effluent conImportantly, no benchmark program exists where regcentrations or pollutant loadings are below allowed limulators or other stakeholders purposefully attempted to
its or (2) it holds, or otherwise obtains within sufficient
constrain the level of cost-savings that a point source
time, enough valid credits to offset exceedences above
buying or otherwise securing credits could realize.
the applicable limit. Of course, they must also meet
Certainly, some trading rules have the effect of reducing
other applicable requirements for compliance in the
cost-savings compared to what point sources would see
broadest sense. These requirements appear either with
under different rules. But these outcomes generally
the dual effluent limits or elsewhere in the permit as a
have been reached as a matter of course through a botblanket condition governing all aspects of permit comtom-up approach to program design as it pertains to
pliance. Together, these permit provisions maintain
cost-effectiveness and potential cost-savings. For examregulatory authority and ensure that compliance is
ple, trading ratios have a direct impact on the cost of a
judged not just by having enough credits but also by
credit to a buyer that can be significant: double the
following all the rules that may be associated with
trading ratio, double the cost of a credit. Thus, at a
securing and applying them. The net effect is that so
ratio of 1.5:1, a point source would need one and a half
long as (l) or (2) above, and the applicable requirecredits, that might cost $10 each, to offset one pound at
ments, are met there is never a moment-not even a
its plant, for a total cost of $15, whereas at a ratio of
second-where a permittee using credits as offsets is not
3:1, the point source would need three credits, for a
in compliance with the Clean Water Act. Therefore,
total cost of $30. As mentioned above, most of the
such permittees have created no harm requiring a
benchmark programs have followed a science-based
penalty, mitigation, or remedy.
approach to setting trading ratios, to the extent avail-
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cations (LAs) among point sources, and between the
able tools and data allowed. It has not been suggested
collective WLAs ~nd LAs, there were no claims that a
in any of these programs that the ratios were set arbiWLA or group of WLAs was set lower because of or to
trarily high to limit cost-savings.
facilitate or force trading.
Third, point-nonpoint trading programs in particular
Within the point-nonpoint source trading arena,
must solve problems associated with a fundamentally
unlevel playing field with respect to the disparate
another problematic approach is setting trading ratios
to achieve a specific outcome. This is done by first
authority that the Clean Water Act and the NPDES
determining a target nonpoint source load reduction
program impose on point sources versus nonpoint
then identifying the trading ratio for a specific point
sources when it comes to requirements for controlling
source or group of dischargers that offers the best
pollutant loadings. By contrast, point-point trading prochance of hitting that target, based on analysis of relagrams pose fewer problems with respect to a level playtive control costs and potential demand for credits.
ing field. Concerns about equity and fairness in programs involving only point sources usually have to do
This problem is similar to setting trading ratios artifiwith baseline responsibilities before
cially high in an attempt to limit
additional treatment generates
cost-savings to credit buyers. Again,
among the benchmark programs,
credits in cases where significantly
trading ratios appear to have avoided
different levels of treatment may be
Stakeholders developing
these pitfalls by using a bottom-up
in use among the dischargers.
approach working from baseline
Clearly, the federal government
point-nonpoint source trading individual or collective environmenand states have powerful tools at
tal performance targets-ultimately
their disposal to establish and
change (usually tighten) wasteoptions must define carefully yielding successful programs.
The fourth principle essential to a
water treatment requirements with
successful program is equity and fairtechnology- or water quality-based
and clearly what nonpoint
ness in determining what actions can
effluent limits. In cases where
generate sellable or otherwise usable
TMDLs are in place, NPDES persource actions are creditable to credits, and whether any credits are
mits provide a strong regulatory
either ineligible or limited in amount
mechanism to force compliance
with wasteload allocations
the satisfaction ofparticipants or durability in some respect. By definition, every trading program needs
(WLAs). In contrast, limiting polto establish trading baselines. When
lutant loadings from nonpoint
and supporters.
loadings are below the baseline, the
sources is largely accomplished, if
difference (surplus reductions) may
at all, through federal and state
be fully or partially creditable.
cost-share programs that help to
When loadings are above the basepay for best management practice
implementation. In fact, most state regulations applicaline, credits will be needed to offset the exceedence or
ble to nonpoint sources are for the development of
overage. If TMDLs are in place, the default baselines
nutrient management plans, or take the form of local
are the WLAs and LAs. If TMDLs are not in place,
ordinances of varying strength and scope that govern
existing individual technology-based or water qualityland use activities. Rarely are additional mechanisms
based effluent limits define the baselines for point
created to implement the load allocations (LAs)
sources, while existing programmatic or legal requireassigned to nonpoint sources.
ments (state and/or local) define the baselines for nonThe disparity in regulatory leverage over point and
point sources.
As a practical matter, baselines for point sources are
nonpoint sources can tempt regulators and other stakeunambiguous, firm, and not optional by virtue of
holders in a trading process to disproportionately lower
NPDES effluent limitations if no TMDL has been conpoint source wasteload allocations (WLAs) relative to
ducted or, if a TMDL is in place, via WLA assignment
their individual or collective contributions to the particand implementation through permits. Baselines for
ular water quality problem. The objective is that pollunonpoint sources can be just the opposite, depending on
tant reductions will be "successfully achieved" more
the approach to land use management taken in a specifquickly than through a more equitable allocation of
ic watershed. This means that stakeholders developing
responsibilities among point and nonpoint sources. It
point-nonpoint source trading options must define careseems that this temptation was not acted upon in the
fully and clearly what nonpoint source actions are credbenchmark situations, as many of the TMDLs were
itable to the sufficient satisfaction of participants and
established prior to or independently of the trading
supporters. At a minimum, this establishes a level playoption. While in these situations some point sources
have scientific or procedural disagreements with their
ing field within the nonpoint source sector-minimizing
rewards for laggards. But more importantly, it elimiWLAs and/or with the overall assignment of load allo-
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Case," as it is in a state of limbo between continuing or
nates the risk to point sources using credits to comply
with their loading limits that a program participant or
dissolving.
third party will come along after the fact and claim the
First, in the Limbo Case, the regulatory authorities
credits are invalid because the actions that generated
have asserted that a permittee needing to use a credit
them were supposed to be counted toward some other
ultimately would be mitigating environmental harm via
legal or voluntary obligation. The benchmark programs
the credit. This approach is making the trading prohave successfully defined nonpoint source baselines with
gram design discussions more like a natural resources
sufficient equity and fairness to gain support for program
damage assessment (NRDA) discussion, in which the
implementation and participation.
actions of parties who have injured the environment are
For the most part, the benchmark programs implesubject to fines and penalties. NRDAs typically are calmented to date demonstrate a variety of approaches to
culated using economic methods that estimate the monassembling the key trading design elements into proetary value of the harm (e.g., in terms of clean up costs
or stakeholder willingness to pay for certain benefits)
grams that generally are considered equitable and fair by
all involved. This success must be
and consider the savings or profits
attributed in part to the technical
the polluter reaped by engaging in
acumen, problem-solving abilities,
the violation. Depending on the
and commitment to multiyear procircumstances, the required paySome have suggested that
gram design phases by key stakeholdments may include a penalty comers. An equally or probably more
ponent over and above the amount
trading ratios be based on the necessary to return the harmed area
important hallmark of these proto its original condition, or provide
grams is the collaboration that
exists, at a minimum between the
an
equivalent environmental benerelative cost of trading versus
point sources and the regulators, and
fit somewhere else if it is impossible
in many cases among a wider group
to completely mitigate the impacted
not trading, instead ofthe
of stakeholders including nonsite. This is an incorrect framework
governmental organizations
to apply to a trading program on a
relative environmental benefit legal, regulatory or policy basis
(NGOs). It is true that in some
because according to our first princases the trading program was proposed by point sources as an alternaofpollutant load reduction at ciple, no environmental harm has
tive to a newly proposed water qualioccurred.
ty target or TMDL implementation
Second, in the Limbo Case, some
one source versus another.
approach, but these rebuttals became
have suggested that trading ratios be
the basis for cooperatively finding a
based on the relative cost of trading
versus not trading, instead of the
more cost-effective approach and
minimizing the inherently adversarirelative environmental benefit of
pollutant load reduction at one source versus another.
al relationship between the regulated and the regulators.
This approach arbitrarily (or not so arbitrarily) limits
cost savings and is inconsistent with both EPA's Policy
Trading Going Wrong? A Case StUdy
and the fundamental economic forces that make trading
Somewhere between one and two dozen trading iniwork. The trading ratio is proposed to be derived from
tiatives are at various stages of development around the
the permittee's economic and financial data, setting the
country in addition to the designed programs that have
trading ratio such that a credit would cost the permittee
passed into the implementation phase. For many of
a desired fraction of the in-plant unit control cost.
these, it is too early to tell where the participants will
Those advancing this approach have not yet stated their
end up relative to the four principles of a good trading
target limit on cost-savings the permittee would achieve
program. One particular situation involving point-nonthrough trading, except to say that the proposed credit
point source trading, however, reveals how prospects for
package will be evaluated on the basis of its cost comsuccess can be compromised when the four principles
pared to in-plant treatment.
are disregarded. In this case, the NPDES permittee has
In the Limbo Case, the regulatory authorities appear
proposed a water quality credit trading program well
to have a substantial concern with the permittee
aligned with the principles of equity and fairness. In
achieving an equal or better environmental result for
contrast, some stakeholders, disregarding these key prinless money. Notably, the assumption also seems to be
ciples, are proffering a very different framework for tradthat an in-plant option, the cost of which would be used
ing than exemplified in the benchmark programs. The
to limit cost-savings with trading, is both technically
situation described is not doomed yet, so will remain
and financially feasible. Neither has been proven yet.
nameless in order not to prejudge its chances for a turnThe permittee has pointed out that even if an in-plant
around. In this article we refer to it as the "Limbo
option would provide the additional control level necesNR&E Summer 2005
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Several solutions have been proposed to this policy and
sary to achieve the loading cap without trading, the cost
mathematical conundrum. The LAs could be revised to
is so disproportionately high compared to the incremenleave more room for creditable reductions. Specific projects
tal reduction gained and to the relative contribution of
or portions of LAs could be made creditable in the TMDL
the permittee's load to the total pollutant load in the
implementation plan, but it is not clear how the TMDL
waterbody system as to render this option infeasible
and the implementation plan would then match up. Some
from an affordability standpoint. As such, it should not
have suggested crafting language for an "early actors" provibe viewed as the default nontrading option, much less
sion that would allow permittees to generate credits by
used as the basis for setting trading ratios.
reducing loads already assigned to other parties under the
Third, other reasons that might lead to a decision to
LAs, but only if the point sources acted within a specified
base trading ratios on cost factors, and not on water
period of time. This approach would not completely absolve
quality benefit equivalencies, would be a goal of achievthose nonpoint sources of their LA responsibilities, but
ing a target level of credit revenue or a goal of achieving
would create strong incentives to implement reductions as
a target level of creditable pollutant load reductions.
creditable, which most agree will not soon (or will not
Both reasons evidence a top-down approach that generever) happen otherwise. Finally, several time-consuming
ally does not respect an equitable allocation of responsiand legally cumbersome avenues appear to be open to the
bilities between point and nonpoint sources. A revenue
state to formally declare some sites with LAs "orphans,"
stream from a point source's credit purchases can be an
which presumably would free up those
attractive source of funding in the
allocations as creditable. As of this
face of a large number of unpermitwriting, it remains unclear if this issue
ted nonpoint sources in the waterwill be resolved. Open questions
shed. As stated earlier, trading
regarding the creditability of reducratios can be set inappropriately in a
Trading must work
tions will discourage most NPDES permanner that favors nonpoint source
mittees from entering the trading proload reduction objectives. In the
in tandem with
gram in any meaningful way.
Limbo Case, the regulators are asking what the trading ratio needs to
be to get the target level of funds or
other efforts to
Future Directions
mass reductions. That is the wrong
Where the four principles are folquestion according to the principles
bring a watershed
lowed-eredit use without penalty,
of a good trading program. The corcost-savings without scorn, mainrect question is what the trading
into compliance.
taining a truly voluntary trading proratio needs to be to establish envigram, and establishing certainty
ronmental equivalency between a
around credit generation-trading
pound reduced/loaded at Source A
can be a successful complement to
versus Sources B, C, and others.
achieving water quality goals in a
Taken to extremes, this wrong
watershed. These principles were
approach will lead to a situation
followed in the benchmark cases and all stakeholderswhere one or more permittees are made responsible for
regulated, regulator, NGO, and others-largely benefited
reductions equal to or even greater than 100 percent of
from enhanced water quality progress. However, when
the total load.
these principles are not followed, the result becomes less
The Limbo Case also fails on the fourth principle of
and less enticing to the potential participants. Trading
clarity and certainty of creditability. In this situation, a
must work in tandem with other efforts to bring a waterdraft TMDL has been developed for some of the watershed into compliance. It cannot be singled out as a savsheds where prospective nonpoint source credit projects
ing grace, a quick ticket, or an expedient approach. A
are being considered. The draft TMDLs assign LAs to
successful trading program depends on thoughtful and
selected nonpoint sources that will require significant
reductions over current loads to achieve water quality
equitable approaches. A trading program should not
squeeze certain sources to put them in the position of
standards. EPA's Policy states that when TMDLs are in
taking responsibility for substantially more than their fair
place, LAs establish the nonpoint sources' baseline for
share of a pollutant load. If this occurs, the net result
trading, which by definition only makes reductions
will be a trading program ultimately set on a course for
beyond that baseline-in the Limbo Case the remaining
economic and environmental failure. Given that it is
and relatively insignificant percentage-ereditable. For
most stakeholders' hope that trading becomes a viable
each of the nonpoint source projects under considerapart of the toolkit in watersheds nationwide, careful and
tion, limiting creditable reductions to a small percentopen consideration of the principles outlined in this artiage of the total will not provide a sufficient number of
credits for the NPDES permittee's estimated future
cle will ensure that future programs ultimately are added
needs.
to the list of successful trading programs.
~
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